

# Global Financial Systems


## Chapter 8

### Bank Runs and Deposit Insurance

Jon Danielsson London School of Economics  
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To accompany  
*Global Financial Systems: Stability and Risk*  
<http://www.globalfinancialsystems.org/>  
Published by Pearson 2013  
Version 4.0, August 2017

## Book and slides



- The tables and graphs are the same as in the book
- See the book for references to original data sources
- Updated versions of the slides can be downloaded from the book web page [www.globalfinancialsystems.org](http://www.globalfinancialsystems.org)

# Bank Runs and Crises

# Bank runs and deposit insurance

- Banks suffer from *maturity mismatches*
- Deposits are short term — assets (loans) are long term
- A bank does not have liquid funds to meet all deposits
- If every depositor in a bank wants their money, the bank goes bust
- We saw this with the *Great Depression*
- Bank runs can develop into bank panics
- Two forms of contagion: *adverse information* and *cross-held assets*. See next 2 slides


# Adverse information

- The depositors have less information about the quality of bank loans (assets) than the bank
- So long as they trust the bank there is no problem
- If, however, they lose that trust they will want their money back
- Which may trigger a bank run
- The trust may not be confined to each bank individually
- Instead, depositors may lose trust in the entire banking system

# Cross-held assets

- Banks don't operate in isolation
- They may be exposed to each other or exposed to the same assets
- Therefore, a problem with one bank may cause a problem with all the banks

# Bank failure rate 1920–1939 in the United States



# It's a wonderful life





## Case — Northern Rock


- The first bank run in the UK since the Overend & Guernsey run in 1866 (only due to the extreme preventative measures in 1914)
- The immediate bank run seems to have been triggered by an announcement by the Bank of England that it was providing emergency liquidity support for Northern Rock
- The underlying cause was its funding structure
- The bank run that was shown on TV screens was only the endgame in a bank run that started months earlier in the international asset markets

# Business plan

- 1/3 of UK mortgage market
- Old-school banking, people deposit money in banks that then make mortgages
- Northern Rock got short-term loans, made mortgages, sold them off and repaid the loan
  1. Borrowed 100 million for three months from the wholesale markets,
  2. Make 1,000 mortgages
  3. Structure the mortgages — sold on to investors
  4. Repay the three-month 100 million loan
- Hidden liquidity risk


# TED spread

Interbank loan rate - t-bill rate




# TED spread 2007

Interbank loan rate - t-bill rate



# Northern Rock



# Hidden risk

- What if it can't sell the mortgages?
- Investors went on strike in the summer of 2007
- It was s done for by the summer of 2007
- Wholesale investors knew immediately
- Took some time for the Financial Services Authority to learn
- Tried to resolve the crisis behind the scenes
- BoE announced liquidity support in October 2007
- Run started the following day
- Recall the Reconstruction Finance Corporation

# Two waves of bank runs

- Sophisticated wholesale investors in July 2007
- Unsophisticated retail investors in October
- UK deposit insurance scheme was quite bad, one that was an invitation to a bank run
- The only sensible strategy for depositors was to run the bank.
- With the benefit of hindsight is clear that the failure of Northern Rock was inevitable given time



# “To stop the Duke, go for gold”

- 1832
- Parliamentary reform in the UK
- Run on BoE to force Duke Wellington to support reform
- Over £1 million was withdrawn from the Bank

# Deposit Insurance and Diamond–Dybvig

# Diamond–Dybvig (1983)

- Banks issuing demand deposits can provide better risk–sharing
- The demand deposit contract will introduce an undesirable equilibrium (a bank run)
- Deposit insurance provided by governments can prevent bank runs
- The bank is assumed to be *mutually* owned
- Individual uncertainty about the desired time profile of consumption
- Sequential service constraint

# Diamond–Dybvig (1983)

- Three periods,  $t = 0, 1$  and  $2$
- \$1 deposited in  $t = 0$ 
  - yielding 1 if withdrawn at  $t = 1$
  - yielding  $R > 1$  if withdrawn at  $t = 2$
- Agents are identical and have a wealth of \$1 in  $t = 0$ .  
There are 2 types of agents:
  - Early** Prefer to consume  $c_1$  in  $t = 1$ , getting  $U(c_1)$
  - Late** Prefer to consume  $c_2$  in  $t = 2$ , getting  $U(c_2)$
- Agent does not know if she is early or late at  $t = 0$ , but learns it at  $t = 1$
- Fraction  $\lambda$  are early, and  $1 - \lambda$  late

# Autarky


## No trade

- Suppose there are no means to shift consumption, i.e. *autarchy*
- And since the agent does not know if she is late or early
- At  $t = 0$  her expected utility is

$$\begin{aligned} E(U) &= \lambda U(c_1) + (1 - \lambda)U(c_2) \\ &= \lambda U(1) + (1 - \lambda)U(R) \end{aligned}$$

- The late agent will have higher eventual utility than the early agent

# Utility under autarchy



# Optimal social insurance

- Suppose there are two agents, one is late, the other is early, with  $\lambda = 0.5$ , is there a way for the agents to insure against the unlucky outcome of being an ‘early’ agent?
- At  $t = 0$  they make the following agreement:
  - At  $t = 1$  the late agent will pay the early agent some amount  $\pi$
  - The *early* will have consumption  $\tilde{c}_1 = 1 + \pi$  and the *late*  $\tilde{c}_2 = R(1 - \pi)$
- If  $\pi$  is chosen correctly, it will increase expected utility

## Solving

We are maximizing for both agents, so the intertemporal budget constraint is

$$\tilde{c}_2 = R(2 - \tilde{c}_1)$$

so the problem is

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\tilde{c}_1} E(U) &= U(\tilde{c}_1) + U(\tilde{c}_2) \\ &= U(\tilde{c}_1) + U(R(2 - \tilde{c}_1)) \end{aligned}$$

Differentiating w.r.t.  $\tilde{c}_1$  gives the standard result


$$\frac{U'(\tilde{c}_1)}{U'(\tilde{c}_2)} = R$$

i.e., the marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal rate of transformation


$$c_2^* \geq c_1^* \iff R \geq 1$$




# Utility under optimal social insurance




# Utility under optimal social insurance



# Utility under optimal social insurance



# Utility under optimal social insurance



# A bank

- Suppose there is a large number of agents
- Diamond–Dybvig show that the same solution is obtained if a financial institution (a bank) creates a bank account that pays the optimal amounts  $1 + \pi$  in  $t = 1$  and  $R(1 - \pi)$  in  $t = 2$
- This shows the role of *financial intermediation* in increasing welfare

# What about bank runs?



# Fractional reserve banking

- Fractional reserve: collect the endowments of consumers and invest a fraction of them in the long-term investments
- Will the bank be able to fulfill the contractual obligation?
- $R < 1$ , late investors will always withdraw early
- $R \geq 1$ , two equilibria — good and bad
- (see 2 slides down)

# Cash

- Suppose there are  $N$  *depositors*
- The amount the bank has on hand at  $t = 1$  is  $\$N$
- But the total value of deposits is  $\$N(1 + \pi)$
- So the bank *does not have enough cash* to pay off all depositors at  $t = 1$



# Bank run

- The *first* person to demand the money at  $t = 1$  will get the full amount  $1 + \pi$
- Up to the fraction  $1/(1 + \pi)$
- That *last*  $\pi/(1 + \pi)$  get *nothing*
- Hence agents want to be the first and *run* the bank

# Two equilibria — good and bad

*No run*      $E(U) = \lambda U(\tilde{c}_1) + (1 - \lambda)U(\tilde{c}_2)$

*Run*      $E(U) = \frac{U(\tilde{c}_1)}{1 + \pi} < \lambda U(\tilde{c}_1) + (1 - \lambda)U(\tilde{c}_2)$

# Deposit insurance

- Government makes the agents that were *first in the queue* and get  $1 + \pi$  pay a *tax* of  $\pi$
- Which is enough to pay the unlucky ones late to the queue
- That is, the government *guarantees* that every agent can get \$1 at  $t = 1$
- So agents always know they get their initial deposit back regardless of whether there is a run or not
- So long as the probability of a run is not 100% *late* agents are better off not running since they have a chance of getting  $\tilde{c}_2 > 1$
- This in turn makes the good equilibria *unique*, so there will be no run

# Deposit insurance

- Who should carry out the deposit insurance scheme, *government* or a *insurance company*?
- Power of taxation
- Deposit insurance law

# Analysis

# Moral hazard

- Deposit insurance can perform a variety of roles, most importantly, preventing bank runs
- It has been criticized for generating moral hazard and incentives for excessive risk-taking by banks
- Both bank depositors and bank managers may contribute to moral hazard

# Pros of deposit insurance

- Protects unsophisticated depositors in the event of closure
- Levels the playing field for large financial institutions of systemic relevance and small ones
- Acts as a speedy source of funds for the resolution of institutions
- Prevents bank runs

# Cons of deposit insurance

- Generates moral hazard
- Creates incentives for excessive risk-taking by banks
- By guaranteeing deposits, market incentives to monitor banks and to demand an interest payment commensurate with the risk of the bank are diminished
- Insurance premium charged cannot always fully internalize the cost of risk, which creates an incentive for banks to take on more risk
- Who should pay for it? The government? Other banks? Insurance premiums?
- Raises difficult questions in Europe



# Misguided views on deposit insurance

- Before the crisis there was the view that because deposit insurance was not used, it was not needed
- This is wrong
- The central conclusion from the DD model is that a deposit insurance scheme that works will never be needed
- The absence of runs does not mean deposit insurance is useless or worse

# Wholesale markets

- Banks increasingly rely on wholesale market
- Northern Rock experience indicates that bank runs come in two waves
  - first sophisticated institutional investors
  - then by unsophisticated retail depositors

# Argentina

- Before 1991, deposit insurance
- In 1991 and 1992, Argentina reversed this policy — intending to convince financial markets that it would not under any circumstances rescue a failing bank
- In 1995, in the face of a forthcoming election and a severe economic crisis sparked by the Mexican peso devaluation of December 1994, the Argentine government reinstated a form of deposit insurance in an effort to stave off an all out bank panic
- Suggests it is not credible to forswear deposit insurance

# 2007

- Triggered a reconsideration of the effectiveness of insurance arrangements in the UK
- After the first *£2,000*, legislation only protected *90%* savings of up to £33,000 — guaranteeing a maximum payout of £31,700
- The time it could take for depositors to get their money back was far too long
- On 1 October 2007, Chancellor Alistair Darling announced that the scheme to protect savers with money deposited in UK banks was expanded to guarantee *100%* of savings

# Cyprus and deposit insurance

We will discuss Cyprus were generally later

- Slow run on Cypriot banks from second part to lesson 2012
- Crisis in March 2012
- Government insists on hitting depositors with insured deposits (below €100,000)
- Undermines the entire deposit insurance scheme in Europe
- Quick backtracking